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Duties to the Court 
         Alan Paterson 
  
1.1 Introduction.  This paper is a slightly revised version of chapter 14 of Alan Paterson and Bruce 
Ritchie, Law, Practice and Conduct for Solicitors,1 the first full length textbook on legal practice 
and professional ethics in Scotland for 120 years. In the paper I offer an in-depth, systematic 
examination of the duties owed to the court by solicitors under Scots law and ethics. It is in this field, 
perhaps above all others that the special character of the solicitor’s agency is most apparent. For here we 
are reminded that the lawyer is a key player in the justice system with obligations not simply to clients, 
fellow professionals, witnesses and other third parties, but also to the court.2 Despite the description of 
solicitors as “officers of the court”,3 it is not the case, as occasional unguarded commentators suggest, that 
the lawyer’s duty to the court4 always trumps the lawyer’s other duties.5 In fact, where the lawyers’ 
various obligations conflict, a delicate balancing operation is called for, and in the process the key 
lodestars will be the needs of the adversarial system of truth finding, the interests of justice and the human 
rights requirement  of a fair trial or hearing. Numerous articles and even books have been written in the 
common law world on the appropriate balance to be struck between these competing duties. There is a 
rich literature in the field, primarily in the United States but to a lesser extent in Australia, Canada, and 
England. In these jurisdictions the balance struck will reflect or in some instances, define, the prevailing 
conception of the role of the advocate in the adversarial system. Indeed, between and within the 
jurisdictions there are subtle variations which evolve over time.  One view that is gaining considerable 
currency in most of these jurisdictions is that the appropriate balance will vary depending on the type of 
case, for example, whether the a lawyer is acting for a criminal accused or in a civil case against the state, 
as opposed to a situation in which the parties are more evenly matched or where the values of a liberal 
 democracy are less clearly at stake.6 Again, there is now a widespread view in the common law world 
that the role of the family lawyer requires a less adversarial balance between the lawyer’s duties.7    
                                                
1
 ( W Green, Edinburgh,2006). This paper is published in this format with the kind permission of the publishers 
and my co-author.  As indicated in the preface I was responsible for this chapter in the book. 
2
 See the various duties contained in Code of Conduct for Scottish Solicitors 2002 and  Article 8 in particular. 
3
 It is widely accepted that solicitors in the UK, like lawyers in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, are officers 
of the court, not least since they are admitted and removed from office by the court. Although barristers in 
England have been less willing to embrace the description, it seems reasonable to treat advocates in Scotland as 
officers of the court, since they too are admitted to the public office of advocate by the Court. 
4
 The lawyer’s duty to the court is in fact a bundle of duties just as the duty to the client is a bundle of separate 
duties. It follows that  when the duties conflict it is a complex balancing of a range of duties which is called for. 
See e.g. the analysis of conflict of  interest as a conflict of duties in A.Paterson & B.Ritchie, Law, Practice and 
Conduct for Solicitors ( W.Green, Edinburgh, 2006) para 7.01. 
5
 See e.g. G. E. Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility, (2nd edn, LBC,Sydney, 2001) at p.444. Even 
Lord Reid in his famous description of the duties of the defence lawyer in Rondel v Worsley refers to the 
“overriding” duty to the court.  In the UK this is no more true than the reverse, namely that the lawyer’s duties 
to the client e.g. to preserve confidences must always triumph over the lawyer’s duty of candour to the court.  
The latter is a view famously or infamously espoused by Monroe Freedman for US lawyers in Understanding 
Lawyers’ Ethics ( Matthew Bender, New York, 1990 ) and Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System ( Bobbs-
Merrill,New York, 1975). In truth, in the UK at least, the tension between the lawyer’s duties to the client and to 
the court will be resolved in different ways depending on the type of case in which it occurs and even on the 
context in which it occurs.   
6
 See e.g David Luban, Lawyers and Justice (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988 ) and C. Menkel-
Meadow, “The Limits of Adversarial Ethics” in D. Rhode (ed) Ethics in Practice ( OUP, New York, 2000 ) at 
pp.123ff.  These debates have been fought out over many years in the USA but in the last 15 years 




1.2 Historical background. The historic association between Scottish law agents and the courts stems 
back to at least the fifteenth century when a professional caste of pleaders began to emerge, in part 
because legal representation, which had grown up in the canonical courts, subsequently spread to the 
secular courts.8 While it is undoubtedly the case that court appearance work was more central to the role 
of the typical solicitor or procurator two centuries ago than it is now,9  the association with the courts  is 
not simply a question of rights of audience and Scottish courts having, as courts of justice in many 
jurisdictions do, an inherent jurisdiction to regulate those who may appear before them. Thus, notaries 
public, Writers to the Signet (WS) and Solicitors in the Supreme Courts (SSC), none of whom historically 
actually appeared in the Court of Session, were nonetheless admitted to office by that Court10 and subject 
to professional discipline by the same Court.11 (Provincial law agents on the other hand were admitted to 
office in, and disciplined by, their sheriff courts). Rather the link with the courts reflects the importance to 
the state of regulating entry to the office of solicitor or law agent. Latterly this had both political and 
fiscal aspects to it. Thus, in the 18th century, Scottish solicitors or procurators were only permitted to act 
as such after taking the appropriate oaths in court, in an attempt to ensure the loyalty of these solicitors to 
the Crown after the 1715 and 1745 jacobite rebellions.12 Following the 1785 Stamp Act, both admission 
and annual certification required payment of the appropriate duty.   
 
Prior to the 19th century the WS and the SSC had exclusive rights to act as law agents in the Supreme 
Courts while in several of the more important sheriff courts13 the local law agents  formed societies 
whose members attained exclusive rights to practise in these courts. However, following the 1870 Royal 
Commission into the Courts of Law in Scotland14 the Law Agents (Scotland) Act 1873 was passed, 
creating a national and uniform mode of entry for solicitors and notaries and enabling any solicitor to 
practise in any court.  Admission15 and removal for serious professional misconduct16 of solicitors were 
now concentrated in the Court of Session. This reform, as Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper noted in Solicitors’ 
Discipline (Scotland) Committee v. B.17 was part of a modernisation process in which Parliament in the 
latter part of the 19th century transferred  the discipline of learned professions from the courts to the 
professions themselves “subject to the overriding control of the Court on appeal”.18 Unfortunately, the 
1873 Act in seeking to strengthen the regulatory regime for solicitors from a practical standpoint, 
inadvertently introduced a conceptual lacuna which has still not been rectified today. Thus the Act 
provided for the Court to handle misconduct whilst expressly leaving the powers of the inferior courts19 
intact “so far as these powers may be necessary for supporting the jurisdiction and maintaining the 
authority” of those courts.20 This formulation appears to derive from Erskine21 and, as Lord Cooper 
                                                                                                                                                  
7
 See e.g. C. Menkel-Meadow, “The Limits of Adversarial Ethics” in D. Rhode (ed) Ethics in Practice ( OUP, 
New York, 2000 ) at pp.123ff and J.Eekelaar, M. Maclean and S. Beinart, Family Lawyers: The Divorce Work 
of Solicitors ( Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000 ). 
8
 See Legal Profession in The Laws of Scotland, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, (Butterworths:Edinburgh, 
1992), vol.13 , Solicitors paras 1126-36; Advocates para 1240 ; J. Henderson Begg, A Treatise on the Law of 
Scotland relating to Law Agents ( hereafter, Begg on Law Agents) ( 2nd edn, 1883 ) Ch 1 Historical Introduction. 
9
 In 2005 the Law Society estimated that about 1,500 of the 9,500 practising solicitors in Scotland  (16% ) could 
be classified as court practitioners. ( Personal conversation with the author). 
10
 See Begg op. cit. Ch.2.  
11
 See Begg op. cit. Ch. 25; Greens Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland (W.Green, 1930) Vol.9; Law Agent 
para. 103. 
12
 See SME Solicitors, para. 1135. 
13
 Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Paisley. 
14






 1941 S.C. 293 at 296. 
18
 at 297. 
19
 The Act is silent as to the residual disciplinary powers of the Court of Session, but the position of the latter 
was drawn into line with that for inferior courts in the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1933 and again in the Solicitors 




 Institute I, ii, 8. 
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notes,22 is normally associated with the jurisdiction enjoyed by Scottish Courts to deal with contempt of 
court. Parliament seems to have assumed that the combination of these contempt powers and the 
misconduct jurisdiction contained in the statute equated to the pre-existing disciplinary powers of the 
courts over all solicitors. Unfortunately, since the contempt powers refer only to solicitors undertaking 
court work or being bound by a court order, the statute appears to have created a regulatory vacuum in 
relation to (1) the discreditable conduct,23 (falling short of misconduct) of solicitors who do not appear in 
court and are not subject to a court order and (2) the discreditable conduct (falling short of misconduct) of 
solicitors who do appear in court,  but which is not covered by the contempt of court jurisdiction of the 
courts. Previously it could have been argued that the courts’ disciplinary jurisdiction in relation to 
solicitors covered both of these.  Indeed, Lord President Normand and two of his First Division 
colleagues tried to argue that the common law powers of the courts to deal with discreditable conduct, as 
distinct from professional misconduct, survived the 1873 Act and its successor, the Solicitors’ Scotland 
Act 1933,24 in the seven judge case of Solicitors’ Discipline (Scotland) Committee v. B.25 However, in  a 
fascinating clash between the First and Second Divisions, Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper  with the help of the 
Second Division and one defector from the First Division, defeated Lord President Normand and the rest 
of the First Division. Despite Lord Cooper’s  reputation as a traditionalist, his belief in the modernising 
intent of Parliament led him26 to observe: “I can see no escape from the conclusion that any common law 
powers to deal with discreditable conduct, as distinct from professional misconduct, which may have 
existed in Scotland prior to 1933, cannot survive the [ Solicitors’ (Scotland) Act 1933 ].”  
 
Ironically, the actual point of difference between the two camps was ultimately resolved in Lord 
Normand’s favour by the Legal Aid and Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1949 Schedule 7, and the whole of the 
1933 Act was subsequently repealed by Schedule 7 of the 1980 Solicitors (Scotland) Act. Unfortunately, 
it cannot be argued that this allowed the common law powers of the lower courts to discipline for 
discreditable conduct to revive, since the normal canons of statutory construction indicate that if a statute 
changing the common law is itself repealed, this does not mean that the common law revives. It follows 
that the disciplinary powers of the courts over solicitors are now governed by the provisions of the 
Solicitors (Scotland) Act  1980. Part IV of that Act (as amended )27 contains the modern day complaints 
procedures for solicitors and the provisions relating to the Discipline Tribunal. The role of the courts is set 
out in s. 54 ( appeals from the Tribunal ), s.55 ( disposal powers ) and s.56 which states: “Except as 
otherwise expressly provided, nothing in this Part shall affect the jurisdiction exercisable by the Court, or 
by any inferior court over solicitors.” If this reasoning is correct s. 56 cannot revive the common law 
powers of the courts but must refer to the position as established in Solicitors’ Discipline (Scotland) 
Committee v. B.,28 namely, that the courts cannot deal with discreditable behaviour, but only misconduct 
in accordance with what is now the 1980 Act, but  that the courts can still discipline solicitors appearing 
before them “to the extent necessary for supporting the jurisdiction and maintaining the authority” of the 
court.29 
 
                                                
22
 Op cit. p.299. 
23
 This equates closely to the modern day concept of unsatisfactory conduct. See Ch. 1 Alan Paterson and Bruce 
Ritchie, Law, Practice and Conduct for Solicitors, ( W Green, Edinburgh, 2006) and s.53 of The Legal 
Profession and Legal Aid(Scotland) Act 2007. 
24
 S.25 of the 1933 Act establishes a Discipline Committee to deal with professional misconduct by solicitors 
although the Court of Session is left as the body responsible for appeals from the Discipline Committee as well 
as some first instance work and all proposals to strike solicitors from the Roll. Section 35 repeats the formula of 
s. 26 of the 1873 Act by stating that the existing disciplinary powers “of the Court or of inferior courts or the 
judges thereof over solicitors practising before such courts, so far as these powers may be necessary for 
supporting the jurisdiction and maintaining the authority of [these courts]” are not affected by the Act except in 
respect to striking solicitors off the roll. 
25
 1941 S.C. 293.  
26
 His three supporting colleagues expressly agreed with his analysis on this point. 
27
 Primarily by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1990. 
28
 1941 S.C. 293.  
29
 s. 35 1933 Solicitors (Scotland) Act. 
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1.3 The jurisdiction exercisable by the court: duties to the court. Even if my analysis is correct 
with respect to the powers of the courts today in relation to misconduct and discreditable conduct, 
there remains the issue as to the exact ambit of the courts’ residual regulatory and disciplinary powers 
which are necessary for supporting the jurisdiction and maintaining the authority of the courts. Lord 
Cooper appears to have thought that the ambit was largely restricted to matters punishable as 
contempt of court, but with respect, it is clear from the actual practice of the courts, that this is too 
narrow a reading of the courts’ powers, particularly in relation to the award of expenses against 
solicitors.  It is submitted instead that to ask what the residual regulatory powers of the courts are, is 
simply another way of  enquiring as to the scope and enforceability of  the duties of solicitors as 
officers of the courts. These duties to the court are derived from the common law and are owed not to 
the judges or courts in which a solicitor chooses to practise, as such, but rather to the wider 
community because of the public interest in the proper administration of justice.30 It is this wider 
public interest that the courts are safeguarding by enforcing these duties despite that fact that they are 
universally referred to as “duties to the court” and partly enforced through the use of the contempt of 
court powers. The exact scope and ambit of these duties in Scots Law is unclear, because of the dearth 
of Scottish authority. However, Ipp’s account of these duties in Commonwealth jurisdictions  seems a 
worthwhile place to start. For Ipp, the duties cover :  
 
(1) a general duty to conduct cases efficiently and expeditiously,  
(2) a general duty not to abuse the court process,  
(3) a general duty of disclosure owed to the court, and  
(4) a general duty not to interfere with the administration of justice.31 
  
 
1.4.1 The duty to conduct cases efficiently and expeditiously – personal liability.  From early 
times it has been recognised that a solicitor whose wrongful conduct has brought about a delay or 
dislocation of proceedings could exceptionally be penalised either through an award of expenses 
against the solicitor in person or through a finding of contempt of court. Thus personal liability in 
expenses may arise from failing to attend court32 or discharging or adjourning a debate or proof  due 
to the fault of the lawyer. Again it has been held that improperly using the procedure of the court to 
delay the outcome to which the opponent is entitled can in appropriate circumstances lead to an award 
of expenses against the lawyer personally. Thus in a case where the sheriff held that it should have 
been obvious to the solicitor for the defender at a certain stage that there was no defence to the action, 
the solicitor was found liable in expenses for failing to withdraw the defences at that stage, and 
instead allowing the defence to stand for another three months until the action reached the head of the 
queue of cases awaiting disposal and then consenting to decree.33   
  
1.4.2 Disrupting the business of the court – contempt of court. Equally, there have been a few 
cases where a solicitor or advocate has failed to appear  in court at the due time and thereafter been 
held to be guilty of contempt of court for egregiously wasting the time of the court. Contempt is a sui 
generis offence34 and has been described as “conduct which challenges or affronts the authority of the 
court or the supremacy of the law itself”.35 In Muirhead v. Douglas36 a solicitor was fined for 
contempt in being 25 minutes late for court. An appeal to the High Court was unavailing, since Lord 
Cameron took the view that the solicitor deliberately chose to run the risk of being late and causing 
“an avoidable and quite possibly serious delay in the due dispatch of the court’s business”.  In more 
recent times, however, the High Court has shown a reluctance to uphold findings of contempt for 
                                                
30
 See Justice D.A. Ipp, “Lawyers’ Duties to the Court”, 1998 (114) The Law Quarterly Review 63 at p.63. 
31
 ibid. p.65. 
32




 See Gerald Gordon, Criminal Law (3rd edn,) (W Green, Edinburgh, 2001)  Ch. 50. 
35
 H.M.Advocate v. Airs 1975 J.C. 64 at 69. 
36
 1979 S.L.T. (Notes) 17. 
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failure to appear timeously in court. In Macara v MacFarlane37 a solicitor who was double booked 
and unable to attend in court to conduct a trial had arranged cover. Unfortunately the cover 
arrangements failed and the solicitor was found guilty of contempt for failing to appear on time. His 
appeal to the High Court was successful. Again, in McKinnon v. Douglas38 a solicitor was convicted 
of contempt of court when he failed to appear in the district court as duty agent. However, it was his 
partner who was the duty agent and because he was ill, the solicitor having tried and failed to find a 
substitute, chose first to attend to three custody cases in the sheriff court before going to the district 
court. He was delayed further in attending the district court due to a misunderstanding, and was 
accordingly one and a half hours late in arriving at the court. Despite offering his profuse apologies he 
was held liable for contempt on the following day by the district court. The High Court quashed the 
conviction noting that in the circumstances there was “no neglect of the obligation to support the 
dignity of the court” nor any “wilful or reckless interference with the administration of justice”. 
Similarly, in Ferguson v. Normand 39 a solicitor who was double booked for the district and sheriff 
courts, and through an error of judgement concluded that he could fulfil both obligations, was held by 
the High Court not to have shown the necessary wilful disregard for the authority or dignity of the 
court to amount to contempt, although he had acted rashly. In like manner, the High Court in 
Murdanaigum v. Henderson 40 suspended a finding of contempt by a sheriff against a solicitor for 
turning up over an hour late for the start of a trial. The sheriff had twice previously warned the 
solicitor as to his conduct and regarded the third failure as contempt. The High Court, however, 
accepted the solicitor’s assertion that his lateness stemmed from failing to put the correct entry in his 
diary and concluded that mere inefficiency could not amount to contempt, and that even given the 
previous warnings the solicitor’s conduct did not amount to a pattern of wilful conduct.  
 
Clearly, the climate has changed significantly since Muirhead. Now it is evident that negligent or 
reckless behaviour even, will not constitute contempt. Thus in McMillan v Carmichael 41 the accused 
was found guilty of contempt of court for yawning noisily and stretching his arms above his head at 
the back of the court and thus distracting the sheriff, without making any attempt to be discreet or 
stifle his yawn. The High Court overturned the finding on the ground that contempt required a wilful 
and intentional challenge to the court’s authority. While this could in appropriate circumstances be 
inferred e.g. from the deliberate failure to heed a warning from the judge, recklessness or gross 
negligence on their own could not give rise to a finding of contempt. Again in Williams v  Clark,42 
Williams appeared in court late, disrupting another trial, and then his mobile phone started ringing. 
This was held to be contempt of court, as there were clear signs indicating that phones should be 
switched off, and the sheriff stated that his behaviour in general amounted to intentional disrespect of 
the court. However, the conviction was suspended on appeal, as the sheriff was not entitled to take 
into account other facts, including William’s lateness, and should have considered only the incident 
regarding the mobile phone. It was however stated that the ringing of a mobile phone may be regarded 
as contempt as it causes significant disruption to the court.  More recently still was the case of HMA v. 
Dickie.43 Here Lord Hardie was confronted with a solicitor who had failed, in his view, to take 
sufficient steps to find an alternative counsel at relatively short notice to undertake a High Court trial, 
with the result that the trial had to be postponed. Lord Hardie considered that the solicitor had been 
cavalier and “grossly reckless resulting in a disregard for the court and the administration of justice”. 
However, in applying McMillan v. Carmichael,44 Lord Hardie concluded that gross recklessness could 
not constitute contempt of court without an intention to challenge or affront the authority of the court 
or to defy its orders.  Lord Hardie considered that the lawyer’s behaviour could be viewed in this 
                                                
37
 1980 S.L.T. (Notes) 26. 
38
 1982 S.L.T. 375. 
39
 1994 S.L.T. 1355.  
40
 1996 S.L.T. 1297. 
41
 1994 S.L.T. 510. 
42
 2001 S.C.C.R. 505. 
43
 2002 S.L.T. 1083. 
44
 1994 S.L.T. 510. 
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light, but that equally it was also compatible with sheer incompetence on the part of the solicitor. The 
solicitor therefore escaped a conviction for contempt of court by the skin of his teeth.  
 
The advocate who failed to turn up for a High Court trial before Lord Hardie a year later45 because he 
was double booked, was not so fortunate. His conduct in failing to appear was held to be reckless, but 
not thereby contempt, following McMillan v. Carmichael.46 However his attempt to exculpate himself 
by the use of  statements which the judge considered to be false, was held by Lord Hardie to 
constitute contempt of court since he deemed them to have been carefully and deliberately (and not 
recklessly) made and therefore in Lord Hardie’s opinion displayed the necessary intention to 
challenge or affront the authority of the court.  Lord Hardie’s finding was the subject of a successful 
appeal to the High Court through the medium of the Nobile Officium 47 but in allowing the petition the 
High Court did not object to Lord Hardie’s statement of the law. In short, therefore, it is clear that 
nowadays merely disrupting the business of the courtroom by lateness or  failing to appear or by one’s 
general behaviour in court, will not of itself constitute contempt “unless there is wilful defiance of or 
disrespect to the court, or behaviour which challenges or affronts its authority”. 48  
 
1.4.3 Disrupting the business of the court – professional misconduct.49 The foregoing cases on 
contempt and the disruption of the business of the court in no way gainsay the fact that both solicitors 
and advocates have a duty not to cause delays or dislocations in proceedings before the courts. This 
duty can in serious cases be enforced through a finding of professional misconduct, not least because, 
unlike contempt, recklessness or gross neglect can be sufficient to establish professional misconduct. 
One such case was Corrigan.50  Here the solicitor was found guilty of professional misconduct in 
respect of his gross failure in his professional duty to take reasonable steps to ensure his timeous 
attendance or to make other satisfactory arrangements for the representation of his clients. Between 
August 1982 and April 1983 the Respondent’s conduct in relation to various courts was the subject of 
adverse comments on five separate occasions.  On three of these occasions, the Respondent was found 
guilty of contempt of court, although he was given an absolute discharge on two of them. The Scottish 
Solicitors Discipline Tribunal looked at the events surrounding the three contempt findings. In 
relation to the first, they held that the Respondent had known that he had two simultaneous trials for 
some time and should have taken action to resolve the conflict in his diary before the night before, 
when it was too late. This behaviour was held to be sufficient to constitute professional misconduct. 
On the second occasion the respondent failed to attend a trial diet because he had wrongly noted the 
date in his diary. The Tribunal held that such carelessness did not contain such an element of 
recklessness or gross neglect that would justify a finding of professional misconduct. On the final 
occasion the respondent retained instructions to represent clients in trials in the sheriff court and the 
district court up to the close of business on the preceding day when it was too late to arrange cover. 
The respondent was delayed in the sheriff court and was accordingly 35 minutes late for the district 
court and subsequently held to have been in contempt of court. The circumstances of this case were 
held by the Tribunal to merit a finding of professional misconduct.   
             
1.4.4 The duty to conduct cases efficiently and expeditiously - the advent of case management. 
We have seen that solicitors that delay proceedings can be penalised in a variety of ways. It is possible 
that this may become more of a problem as the culture of judicial case management begins to 
                                                
45
 HM Advocate v. Tarbett 2003 S.L.T. 1288. 
46
  ibid. Lord Hardie added that had the failure to appear been a willful act, that would have been contempt. 
47
 John Mayer 2004 S.C.C.R. 734.   
48
 R. McInnes and D. Fairley, Contempt of Court in Scotland ( CLT Professional Publishing, Hertfordshire, 
2000 ), at p.45. See also R. McInnes, “Conflict between Bench and Bar” 2004 SLT (News) 2. 
49
 J.Ryder, Professional Conduct for Scottish Solicitors ( Butterworths, Edinburgh, 1995 )  p.82 argues 
persuasively that delay to court proceedings by a solicitor can also amount to IPS. It is certainly more than 
arguable that the Court would constitute “any person with an interest” for the purposes of s.33 of the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990. The Law Society, to date have given the phrase a 
narrow interpretation. 
50
 See I.Smith and J. Barton Procedures and Decisions of the Scottish Solicitors’ Discipline Tribunal  (T & T 
Clark, Edinburgh, 1995) at p. 134 and Discipline Tribunal Decision (DTD) 636/84a. 
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permeate in the future.  Traditionally, in Scotland the parties and their legal representatives have 
effectively been more responsible for the pace of litigation ( both civil and criminal ), than the 
judiciary.   However in Scotland, as in other parts of the Commonwealth, the increasing cost of 
litigation has led to a growing recognition that it is inappropriate to leave the progress of proceedings 
largely to the inclinations of the parties and the work practices of their representatives. In a number of 
sheriff courts in the last twenty years ( principally Dundee and Kilmarnock ) the shreival bench has 
demonstrated that the local legal culture which prevailed amongst the professional participants in 
courts could be changed. Thus the sheriffs in these courts, by adopting a more restrictive approach to 
the granting of continuations and adjournments, were able to speed up the pace of litigation in their 
courts. There have also been a number of procedural reforms, for example  the introduction of 
intermediate diets in summary criminal cases, the Bonomy reforms in solemn cases, and the 
Coulsfield Rules in personal injury cases in the Court of Session which have encouraged the judiciary 
to take a more directive/interventionist approach to case management.51 Further indications of 
changing times in this area can be found in the dicta of Lord Hardie in the Dickie52 and Tarbett 
53cases, which antedated the Bonomy reforms. In the first, Lord Hardie indicated that except in the 
most unusual of cases adjournments should not be granted simply because the accused wants the 
services of a particular counsel. He added:54  
 
“Adjournment of cases to later sittings causes problems for witnesses, whose memory may be 
affected by the passage of time. They may also result in an accused person being detained in 
custody for a longer period than would otherwise be necessary…Moreover adjournments 
cause disruption to current and future sittings of the High Court, resulting in unnecessary 
delays to the determination of cases, additional inconvenience to the public, who are involved 
as jurors or witnesses and a waste of public expenditure and resources.”  
 
In Tarbett 55 Lord Hardie was equally trenchant, observing that the practice of seeking numerous 
adjournments stems from a minority of solicitors not being willing to prioritise High Court work so 
that cases can proceed to trial at the first opportunity, and a minority of counsel and solicitor 
advocates seeking adjournments because of inadequate time for preparation, only for the adjourned 
hearing to be attended by a new counsel or solicitor seeking yet another adjournment for the same 
reason. He added: “In my opinion such practices are undesirable and are contrary to the interests of 
justice. They result in unnecessary delays in the commencement of trials, with adverse consequences 
for the accused, particularly if he is custody, as well as witnesses and prospective jurors. By their 
actions the minority of practitioners bring the system of justice in Scotland and the legal profession as 
a whole into disrepute.”   
  
1.5 The Duty not to Abuse the Court Process.56 The second set of duties to the court stems from the 
need to preserve the integrity of the adversarial system. It follows that a lawyer should not seek 
unreasonably to raise or defend an action for which there is no legal justification.   Where the lawyer 
knows that there is no cause for action but raises or continues with it nonetheless, for example,  in 
pursuit of publicity or some other illegitimate motive, he or she will be potentially liable in contempt 
of court,57  to a conduct complaint and / or an award of expenses against the lawyer personally.58 This 
                                                
51
 The most obvious example in England and Wales is the Woolf reforms. 
52
 2002 S.L.T. 1083. 
53
 2003 S.L.T. 1288. 
54
 2002 S.L.T. 1083 at p.1086F. 
55
 2003 S.L.T. 1288 at p.1291E. 
56
 Ipp, op.cit. pp.79-83 
57
 See e.g. R v. Weisz [1951] 2 K.B. 611 at p.617. 
58
 Abuse of civil process can also be an actionable wrong. See e.g. D.M. Walker, Civil Remedies ( W. Green & 
Son, Edinburgh:1974 ) pp.998 et seq. 
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is true whether the purpose of the lawsuit is to denigrate the other side,59 to satisfy the client’s malice 
against the opponent60 or simply to buy time.  
 
Deliberate and wilful abuse of process61 through raising or defending a case for which the lawyer is 
aware that there is no justification is fortunately rare. However, the summary jurisdiction of the court 
to take action under the common law against wayward officers of the court extends further than this. 
Although Begg62 discusses the summary jurisdiction of the courts, he was writing before Solicitors’ 
Discipline (Scotland) Committee v. B.63 and its English equivalent -  Myers v. Ellman.64  Myers made it 
clear that the summary jurisdiction of the English courts was not limited to instances of deliberate 
wrongdoing or dishonesty. Thus, although a “mere mistake or error of judgement is not generally 
sufficient…. a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is the solicitor’s duty to ascertain with 
accuracy may suffice”. 65 Again in Edwards v. Edwards 66 Sachs J. notes that “anything which can be 
termed an abuse of the process of the court” is included, adding that “unreasonably to initiate or 
continue an action when it has no or substantially no chance of success” might be covered. The 
statutory wasted costs jurisdiction of English courts67 has now partially superseded the common law 
inherent jurisdiction of the court with respect to abuse of process, however, it is clear that the earlier 
case law established that the abuse of process jurisdiction arose if the lawyer knew or ought 
reasonably to have known that the argument was unsustainable. Recklessness is therefore covered as 
well as intentional actings.  
 
What about Scotland? The narrower disciplinary role of the courts,68 and the dearth of decided cases 
perhaps requires us to be cautious in reaching a definitive conclusion. In Manson v. Chief Constable 
of Strathclyde 69 expenses were awarded against a solicitor who raised an action which was 
“manifestly incompetent and irrelevant.” Moreover, the cases of Stewart v. Stewart70 and Blyth v 
Watson 71 strongly suggest that in Scotland also the court can award expenses where the solicitor was 
reckless or ought reasonably to have known that the argument was unsustainable. In Blyth the 
solicitors for a personal injury victim reached a full and final settlement of the case in 1984 only for 
them to re-raise the same claim a year later when it looked as though the victim’s condition was going 
to dramatically worsen. Having obtained legal aid they proceeded to raise the action in order to get 
within the triennium period of limitation. Thereafter, the solicitors accepted that the earlier settlement 
excluded the subsequent claim. Lord Morrison in the Outer House held that in raising the action the 
                                                
59
 See the New Zealand rule of Professional Conduct r. 7.04 “ A practitioner must make all reasonable efforts to 
ensure that legal processes are used for their proper purposes only and that their use is not likely to cause 
unnecessary embarrassment, distress or inconvenience to another person’s reputation, interests or occupation.” 
60
 E.g. Re Cooke (1889) 5 TLR 407 at 408. If, however, the action is well founded, the client’s motive is usually 
irrelevant.  
61
 “It is an abuse of the process of the Court to bring a claim with no genuine belief in its merits but in bad faith 
and for an ulterior purpose…A party who makes an exorbitant claim with no genuine belief in its merits, 
rejecting all reasonable offers of settlement, and exploiting his own inability to satisfy an order for costs in order 
to bring pressure on the other party to settle for an excessive sum, is abusing the process of the Court.” per 
Millett L.J in Bowring v. Corsi [1994] 2 Lloyds Law Rep 567 at p.580. 
62
 Begg on Law Agents, op.cit. p.280. 
63
 1941 S.C. 293.  
64
 [1940] A.C. 282. 
65
 Per Lord Wright in  Myers, op.cit. at p.319. 
66
 per Sachs J. [1958] P 235. 
67
 Presently contained in ss.51(1) and (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (as amended ). See e.g. Count Tolstoy-
Miloslavsky v. Lord Aldington  [1996] 2 All E.R. 556. 
68
 A comparison of  Solicitors’ Discipline (Scotland) Committee v. B.  and  Myers v. Ellman  appears to show that 
the English legislation on solicitors’ discipline has expressly reserved more of the common law disciplinary 
powers of the English courts than the Scottish legislation has for Scottish courts. In practice, the difference is 
not likely to be that great since Lord Cooper in the former case appears to have underestimated the scope of the 
summary jurisdiction of Scottish courts, by implying that it was largely confined to the contempt of court power.  
69
 The Scotsman, Dec 16, 1983  referred to in McPhail, op. cit. p.34. 
70
 1984 S.L.T. 58. 
71
 1987 S.L.T. 616. 
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solicitors must have been aware that it was insupportable. In the light of the facts of the case it is 
respectfully submitted that this need not have been the case, however, it is clear that Lord Morrison 
was taking the view that the solicitors ought to have known  that the subsequent claim was 
insupportable. In Stewart,  Sheriff Ireland QC took the view that even if the solicitor honestly 
believed that the defence he had put forward for his client was a tenable one, nevertheless he ought to 
have known or concluded long before the diet of proof  that it was in fact unsustainable, and his 
failure to do so amounted to an abuse of process. Certainly, it seems undeniable that Webster is right 
to argue72 that the lawyer must investigate a case properly before raising an action and should not 
abuse the process of court by raising an action, out of anger or malice, which is likely to unnecessarily 
injure the defender. 
 
It should, however, be stressed that in most of the jurisdictions where abuse of process applies, it is 
clear from the case law that merely because the lawyer chooses to act or to continue to act even when 
it is obvious that there is little chance of winning, does not necessarily open him or her up to sanction. 
To hold otherwise would be to severely undermine the effective operation of the adversarial system, 
for this is an area where the lawyer’s duty to pursue the best interests of the client73  comes in direct 
conflict with the lawyer’s duty to the court. Unpopular clients or those with weaker or more 
problematic cases would find it even harder than they now do to obtain representation if the two 
duties were not kept in balance. Thus Lord Esher M.R. observed that74 where the lawyer knows that 
the case is “absolutely and certainly hopeless” it is a breach of duty and dishonourable to continue to 
act. However, he added that it was perfectly acceptable to continue to act if the lawyer is unable to 
conclude that the  case was indeed “absolutely and certainly hopeless”. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
noted more recently in an analogous situation:75 “A legal representative is not to be held to have acted 
improperly, unreasonably or negligently simply because he acts for a party who pursues a claim or 
defence which is plainly doomed to fail…”. As the judge also recognised, it is not always easy to 
distinguish between a case that is hopeless and one where there is an abuse of process. However, he 
was surely right to conclude that the benefit of any doubt must be given to the lawyer, i.e. the duty to 
pursue the best interests of the client.76  
 
What more then is required to invoke the jurisdiction? Here it is difficult to be definitive in Scotland, 
because of the shortage of case law. However one situation where a lawyer who was aware or ought 
reasonably to have been aware that the case or defence was unsustainable will be found liable in 
expenses is where the lawyer acted from an ulterior or illegitimate motive, thus causing loss to the 
other side.77  
 
1.5.1 Abuse of the Court Process and defenders – the role of skeletal defences. It is clear that  
defenders can be guilty of abuse of process just as pursuers can – and the same range of sanctions 
exists. Thus courts in a range of jurisdictions have rejected as an abuse of process efforts by lawyers 
defending civil cases to unnecessarily lengthen the duration of proceedings.78 Indeed, the case with 
the lengthiest exposition of the solicitors’ liability in expenses in Scotland related to the defence of a 
                                                
72J.Webster, Professional Ethics and Practice for Scottish Solicitors  ( Avizandum, Edinburgh, 2004) at para. 
3.08. 
73
 Sometimes know as the duty of “zealous advocacy”. 
74
 In Re Cooke (1889) 5 TLR 407 at 408. 
75
 Ridehalgh v. Horsefield  [1994] 3 All E.R. 848 at p.863a, although this was a wasted costs order case. 
76
 As A. Boon and J. Levin observed in The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales ( Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1999 ) at 218, it would be unfortunate if lawyers who were bona fide running test cases in 
the hope of changing the law were to be penalised by awards of costs against them. 
77
 Again, Goldberg J in White Industries, ibid is instructive. As he observed (at p. 236): “ it involves some 
deliberate or conscious decision taken by reference to circumstances unrelated to the prospects of success with 
…a recognition that there is no chance of success but an intention to use the proceeding for an ulterior purpose 
or with disregard of any proper consideration of the prospects of success…” 
78
 E.g. the USA ( see the Model Rules 3.2 “ A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client”), New Zealand and Australia (see Dal Pont op.cit. at p.470). 
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case for summary ejection from heritable property, namely, Stewart v Stewart.79 As we saw earlier the 
defence solicitor had put forward a frivolous defence although he genuinely believed that it was a 
tenable argument. However, in finding him liable in expenses Sheriff Ireland QC noted that while he 
could not be criticised for stating the defence of personal bar as he did, his failure thereafter to apply 
his mind at any stage prior to the proof to the question whether such a defence could be plausibly be 
argued, constituted an abuse of process.  Sheriff Ireland’s exposition of the law is worthy of 
reproduction in extenso: 
 
“It has long been recognised that for certain breaches of duty, such as failing to attend court, a 
solicitor may be found personally liable in expenses.  In my opinion it is equally a breach of duty if 
a solicitor improperly uses the procedure of the court to delay the achievement of a result to which 
a litigant is entitled.  When a pursuer asserts a claim by serving a summons or initial writ, he is 
entitled to the remedy he seeks unless his opponent can show some ground in fact or law why this 
should not be granted.  If no appearance is entered, the pursuer is entitled to decree in absence.  If 
appearance is entered and defences are lodged, the pleadings have to be adjusted and the law 
debated and the facts ascertained, and it may be months or years before the remedy is achieved.  
But this delay is not something to which a defender is entitled in order that he may postpone the 
discharge of his obligations.  It arises solely because the time is required to ascertain the truth if 
there is a genuine dispute about the facts or the law.  It seems to me to follow that if a defender 
who has no defence either in fact or in law uses the procedures not to establish his right but to 
delay the enforcement of a right which is undeniable, he is guilty of an abuse of process and, if he 
is a solicitor, ought to pay what his conduct has cost the other party to the litigation….[ It matters 
not that ] he may honestly have believed that there was a defence.  A professionally qualified 
solicitor is in my view required to do more than abstain from dishonesty.  It is his positive duty, in 
the words of Lord Atkin in Myers v. Elman, ‘to conduct litigation . . . with due propriety’. I do not 
intend to suggest that a solicitor acts improperly in all cases by entering appearance and stating a 
defence which may turn out to be unsubstantial.  It may be perfectly proper, if there is initially 
doubt about the facts or the law, to put in skeleton defences to preserve the position while 
investigations are made.  But as soon as the facts and the law are elucidated, and it appears that 
there is no defence to the action, the defence should be withdrawn and decree allowed to pass.  It is 
in my opinion improper to allow the defence to stand until the action reaches the head of the queue 
of cases awaiting disposal, and then to consent to decree.  That is to use the intervening time not 
for the necessary purpose of determining disputed issues of fact or law, but for the improper 
purpose of delaying the enforcement of a right about which there is no longer any dispute.”80    
 
Sheriff Ireland’s judgement is instructive on a number of fronts. First he recognises (as Lord Esher 
and  Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. did) that the court’s summary jurisdiction does not arise simply 
because the defender has put forward an argument that the court subsequently finds to be unsound, 
since to do so would undermine the adversarial system. It is submitted therefore that in Scotland as in 
England, for so long as we retain  the adversarial system substantially in its current guise, then 
although the lawyer’s duty to the client has to be balanced against the duty to the court, the benefit of 
any doubt should go to the lawyer’s duty to safeguard the interests of the client. Secondly, Sheriff 
Ireland points to the limitations which should attach to the use of skeleton defences. Thus the Law 
Society indicated in 198681 that except in circumstances of extreme urgency, the lodging of skeleton 
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 1984 S.L.T. 58. 
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 For an expression of very similar sentiments in  Australia see Goldberg J. in White Industries Pty Ltd v. 
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defences should be avoided, and should not be used simply as a delaying tactic.82 The Society also 
added that while bare denials may be relevant they can saddle the defender with additional and 
unnecessary expense.83 Here  the lawyer’s duty to pursue the best interests of the client is very clearly 
being tempered by the duty to the court not to commit an abuse of process.84  
 
1.5.2 Abuse of the Court process and criminal cases. Sheriff Ireland in Stewart referred to an 
English criminal defence case, Abraham v. Justun 85 in a way that suggested that criminal cases are no 
different than civil cases when it comes to the issue of abuse of process. Halsbury,86 however suggests 
that the abuse of power inherent jurisdiction in civil and criminal proceedings has developed along 
separate lines in England and Wales and that the test is harder to invoke in criminal cases. In my view 
this should also be the position in Scotland.  As Dal Pont87 argues, the balance between the duty to the 
client and that to the court should be more in favour of the former than the latter in criminal cases for 
three reasons: first because the criminal proceedings are initiated by the Crown; second because the 
prosecution has to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused is entitled to put the 
Crown to the test and thirdly that the accused has the sole option as between pleading guilty or not 
guilty.88  
 
1.5.3. Basis of abuse of process jurisdiction. Although the commentators are agreed that the abuse 
of process jurisdiction relates to breach of duty to the court, from time to time the question has arisen 
as to what the basis of the court’s jurisdiction is to find the lawyer personally liable in expenses such 
cases. Lord Wright in Myers v. Ellman89 is particularly instructive where he observes that “the 
underlying principle is that the Court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors 
and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice 
in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally.” 90 For Lord Wright the jurisdiction is 
compensatory as well as punitive and in this line of thought he is supported by Viscount Maugham.91 
As the cost of litigation rises, the penalty associated with the jurisdiction becomes more severe. 
Because of this and the court’s natural reluctance to undermine the adversarial system, awards of 
expenses in abuse of process cases are relatively uncommon - in Scotland or elsewhere. However, 
judges and lawyers alike are aware that the jurisdiction exists and the existence of the power to award 
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 Ellon Castle Estates v Macdonald 1975 S.L.T. (Notes) 66 illustrates the limitations of skeleton defences. 
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MacPhail, Sheriff Court Practice (2nd edn) p.302 indicates, a skeleton defence may be a perfectly fair and 
relevant defence. See also Ganley v. Scottish Boatowners Mutual Insurance Association  1967 S.L.T. (Notes) 45 
and Gray v. Boyd 1996 S.L.T. 60.   
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expenses against lawyers personally influences the behaviour of both the judges and those appearing 
before them.92 
  
1.5.4. The position of counsel. It is widely believed that whatever may be the position concerning the 
award of expenses against a solicitor for breach of duty to the court through an abuse of process, there 
is no power in Scotland to award expenses against counsel in the same situation.93 This is in line with 
the English position where it was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ridehalgh v. Horsfield 94 that 
there was no common law power to award costs against a barrister. This situation was said to stem 
from the fact the common law immunity from suit of barristers and the fact that strictly speaking 
English barristers are not “officers of the court” on historical grounds and not therefore subject to the 
court’s summary jurisdiction ( except with respect to contempt of court).  The argument from the 
barrister’s immunity is misconceived, since the policy objectives for the immunity are not the same as 
those lying behind attempts to make lawyers open to sanction  for breaching their duty to the court not 
to commit an abuse of process.95 In any event, now that the civil immunity from suit of barristers in 
litigation has been removed in England and Wales,96 and arguably also in Scotland,97 this argument 
has lost most of its cogency. As for the argument that advocates owe no duties to the court to avoid an 
abuse of process because they are not strictly officers of the court, this strikes the modern mind as 
special pleading of a peculiarly unconvincing nature. If barristers or advocates can be punished for 
contempt, why not for breach of duty to the interests of justice? 98  
 
While Scottish authority on this point is hard to come by, one of the Institutional Writers, Bankton,99 
states that if “during the dependence of a cause, an advocate discovers that it is unjust or calumnious, 
he ought to desert it, in consequence of his oath at his admission, and in point of conscience and 
justice to his character” indicating that a failure to so act was misconduct if not a breach of duty. It is 
unclear whether Advocates are officers of court. In Scots law, however, they are admitted and 
removed from the public office of advocate by the Court of Session. Moreover there is absolutely no 
doubt from the case law , the Faculty of Advocates’ Guide to the Professional Conduct of Advocates, 
and from entry on Advocates in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia that members of the Faculty owe 
extensive duties to the courts and that they can be punished by the court for contempt of court for their 
conduct in the performance of their professional duties. Finally, Sheriff Ireland in Stewart indicates 
that in his view there was no difference between the duty owed to the court by counsel and by 
solicitors. It is respectfully submitted that this is the case and that there is no justification for holding 
that Scottish advocates are not subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court in relation to duties to 
the court. Accordingly there would appear to be no reason why a Court could not award expenses 
against an advocate where an abuse of process can be established, even without a statutory 
intervention. 
  
1.6 A general duty of candour owed to the court. This duty, which comes into sharpest contrast  
with the lawyer’s duties to pursue his or her client’s interests to the best of the lawyer’s ability and the 
duty not to breach the duty of confidentiality to the client, is as longstanding as the  duty not to abuse 
the court process. The strength of the adversarial system in the UK and other common law countries 
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has ensured that it is in this area that curbs on the lawyer’s ability to zealously advocate his or her 
client’s cause are most keenly contested.   
 
1.6.1 Candour in matters of law.  It  has long been established in Scotland, as in most English 
speaking countries, that not only must lawyers not deceive the court on matters of law, but also that 
they are under a positive duty to make full disclosure as to all the law relevant to the case in hand. 
This means all authorities, statutory or otherwise which are in point must be brought before the court 
by each party, whether they support or undermine the position being argued for by that party.100 This 
requires a lawyer either to keep up to date with changes in the law or to research the field if it is 
outside the lawyer’s normal area of practice.  However, the rule does not require the lawyer to present 
an impartial or disinterested account of the law,101 and the lawyer is entitled and probably obliged to 
make all reasonable and good faith efforts to distinguish those authorities which do not support the 
position for which the lawyer is contending. This obligation of candour applies equally in uncontested 
as well as contested cases.  It has been said that a corollary of the rule is that a lawyer may not 
advance a legal argument which the lawyer knows to be unsound.102  As against this the malleability 
of the common law and the fact that ultimately, to paraphrase Dr Johnson,  it is the court’s job to 
determine the soundness of legal propositions rather than the lawyer’s, probably entails that the 
constraints imposed by this injunction may be rather limited.103 The standard articulation of the 
principle is to be found by Lord Chancellor Birkenhead in the House of Lords decision in  The Glebe 
Sugar Refining Company Ltd v The Trustees of the Port and Harbours of Greenock:104  
 
“It is not, of course, in cases of complication possible for their Lordships to be aware of all 
the authorities, statutory or otherwise, which may be relevant to the issues which in the 
particular case require decision.  Their Lordships are therefore very much in the hands of 
counsel, and those who instruct counsel, in these matters, and this House expects, and indeed 
insists, that authorities which bear one way or the other upon matters under debate shall be 
brought to the attention of their Lordships by those who are aware of those authorities.  This 
observation is quite irrespective of whether or not the particular authority assists the party 
which is so aware of it.  It is an obligation of confidence between their Lordships and all those 
who assist in the debates in this house in the capacity of counsel”105. 
 
The duty of disclosure is not restricted to advocates. Thus the same obligation applies to solicitor 
advocates:106 
 
“(1)…Where a solicitor advocate is aware of a previous decision binding on the court, or of a 
statutory provision relevant to a point of law in issue, it is his duty to draw that decision or 
provision to the attention of the court whether or not it supports his argument and whether or 
not it has been referred to by his opponent.” 
 
There is every reason to believe that the rule also applies to solicitors appearing in courts and before 
tribunals.107There have been few reported cases in which the rule has been enforced,108 but failure to 
refer to a relevant authority may be reflected in the award of expenses, and could be a conduct 
offence. The seeming clarity of the rule hides certain areas of debate. First, the ambit of the rule when 
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applied to a precedent. Does it only apply to precedents which are binding on the court or tribunal 
before whom the appearance is being made, or does it extend to authorities which are merely 
persuasive? This is a point that has attracted some attention in Federal jurisdictions such as Australia 
and the USA where there are many more persuasive than mandatory decisions.  There is no definitive 
ruling on this matter, but it seems likely that Scotland would adopt the position that only decisions 
which are binding  or in point and highly persuasive, for example, they emanate from an English 
House of Lords Appeal or Privy Council decision not directly binding on a Scots court, need be cited 
to the court. Thus, despite globalisation and the greater availability of foreign law reports, it would 
probably be thought unreasonable to expect the rule to apply to foreign case law unless, perhaps, the 
case is being argued at the level of the House of Lords or the Privy Council.109  A second area for 
debate relates to the rationale for the rule. At first blush it seems somewhat curious that the duty of 
candour extends further in relation to matters of law than it does in relation to matters of fact – when 
it might be thought that it was easier for the judge to conduct his or her own researches into the  
former than the latter.110 Part of the explanation may be that adherence to the rule will usually  not 
involve sacrificing the lawyer’s duty to the client, since following it will rarely violate the client’s 
confidentiality and with it the client’s trust. The rationale put forward by Lord Birkenhead in Glebe 
Sugar Refining111 that not to have such rule would entail obtaining a decision based on imperfect 
knowledge or involve turning the court into a debating assembly upon legal matters, seems less 
compelling, since such arguments apply equally to questions of fact.   
  
1.6.2 Candour in matters of fact. The basic proposition here is encapsulated in  art.8 of the Code of 
Conduct for Scottish Solicitors: 
 
“Solicitors must never knowingly give false or misleading information to the court”. 
 
Superficially this appears not dissimilar to the lawyer’s duty to the court on matters of law. In reality 
there is a significant difference. While the lawyer must act honestly and non-deceitfully with respect 
to any evidence which he or she has led in, or information provided to, the court, there is ordinarily no 
obligation to place all relevant evidence before the court. Thus, normally, the lawyer need not disclose 
the existence and identity of an adverse witness to the other side,112 nor need the lawyer lead every 
available witness with relevant information.113  Indeed, if there is evidence that is actively harmful to 
the client’s case which derives from confidential or privileged discussions with the client, there is a 
positive ethical obligation not to lay it before the court.  
 
1.6.3  False or fabricated evidence. All but the most ardent supporters of zealous advocacy accept 
that the adversarial system does not permit lawyers to knowingly put before the court false or 
fabricated evidence, no matter what the kind of proceeding nor whether the deception causes harm to 
anyone.114  The Young case115 involved a solicitor who misled the court in two separate cases. In the 
first, the solicitor pretended that his client had died intestate, in order to assist the surviving spouse, 
even though he was aware that the client had left a holograph will.  The solicitor subsequently 
submitted applications to the court (twice) and to an insurance company (once), indicating that the 
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client had died intestate.  In the second case, when the client died, his will was sent to a family 
member and got lost in the post.  The solicitor once more submitted an application to the court stating 
that the client had died intestate, this time to save the family the trouble and expense of seeking to 
prove the tenor of a lost document.  The Solicitors (Scotland) Discipline Tribunal held that the 
solicitor had submitted these applications to the court in the knowledge that they were untrue and 
dishonest and found him guilty of professional misconduct in that he had knowingly placed before the 
court information that was not simply misleading but false. 
 
If the Young case was straightforward the Bridgwood case116 was rather less so. Mr Bridgwood, a 
solicitor, found himself in a difficult situation when a longstanding client informed him that she had 
given the police a false name and address for herself, when arrested. Contrary to his advice, the client 
refused to disclose her true name to the authorities.  Instead, she pled guilty under the false name, 
thereby avoiding her previous convictions, and Mr Bridgwood spoke in mitigation.  He considered it 
was proper for him to do this, provided that he did not explicitly refer to her using her assumed name, 
or refer to her character. Unfortunately, the courts did not come to the same conclusion.117 Mr 
Bridgwood was convicted for acting in a manner tending and intending to pervert the course of public 
justice, and was fined £2000 by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. It was not simply the use of the 
assumed name that mattered. In the UK a person can call themselves anything they like. Had the 
change of name been done legally , e.g. by deed poll or marriage, it could not have been a false name. 
It was the adopting of the assumed name in order to deceive the court over the issue of previous 
convictions that made it a breach of duty to the court. Similarly, an address is not a false one if it is 
not the client’s principal place of residence, provided it is an address where the client can be 
contacted. As Burleigh observed: 
 
“A solicitor takes part in a positive deception of the court when he puts forward to the court 
himself, or lets his client put forward, information which the solicitor knows to be false, with 
the intent of misleading the court. The defence solicitor need not correct information given to 
the court by the prosecution or any other party which the solicitor knows will have the effect 
of allowing the court to make incorrect assumptions about the client or his case, provided the 
solicitor does not indicate in any way his agreement with the information”118 
 
The English Law Society’s criminal law committee considered the case and added that in this 
situation the following should apply: 
 
1.  The solicitor should seek to persuade the client to give the court the correct name and address. 
If the client refuses the solicitor should withdraw from acting.  
 
2.  Where the client gives the correct name but a false address or date of birth, the solicitor 
should also withdraw, since the false information is relevant to previous convictions or to 
bail.  
 
The committee did not deal with the situation of what the lawyer should do if, having withdrawn from 
acting the client informs the lawyer that they intend to persist in using the false identity and thus  
pervert the course of justice. The Canadian solution that this “future harm or crime”  permits, but does  
not require the lawyer to breach confidentiality and disclose the deceit119  may apply in Scotland an 
 England as a public interest exception to the confidence, but would not be effective against an action  
based on breach of legal professional privilege. 
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The Bridgwood case is interesting on a number of fronts, not least because of the guidance it might 
offer in cases of client perjury. It is, after all, a short step from saying that a lawyer who fails to take 
remedial action where a known falsehood has been put before the court by his or her client, is guilty 
of assisting in the positive deception of the court, to holding that the lawyer must also take remedial 
action when the client has given perjured testimony to that court.120 Equally, while Bridgwood dealt 
with the situation where the client had misled the court before the lawyer became involved in the case, 
what would be the position if the false evidence had been led in court unwittingly by the lawyer, after 
he had become involved in the case, e.g. he had not known the client beforehand and therefore 
happily referred to the client using the false name in ignorance that it was not the client’s real name. 
Clearly, such an innocent error cannot give rise to a conduct offence ( unless the lawyer’s conduct 
was negligent or reckless ), nonetheless, once the lawyer becomes aware of the deception, it appears 
that the lawyer must take remedial action. It is unclear however, whether it would be enough to 
simply withdraw121 – which might send a coded form of disclosure to the judge and prosecutor, 
though not a jury – or whether as one or two have argued, the lawyer must correct the error.122  
 
1.6.4  The ambit of misleading evidence.  Paterson and Ritchie note in Law, Practice and Conduct 
for Solicitors123 that the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal draws distinctions between (1) 
intentional and deliberate deceit or lying - which is clearly misconduct, (2) recklessly made statements 
which are false – which will generally be misconduct and (3) negligent statements which are neither 
reckless nor intentionally misleading – which will amount to unsatisfactory conduct at most. Similarly 
the professional rules of the Faculty of Advocates124  and the English Bar125 refer to the duty not to 
mislead the court knowingly or recklessly. Commentators on the adversarial system in the anglo-
american world have tended, however, to focus on other distinctions when discussing misleading 
evidence. The first, and basic distinction,   is between putting forward misleading evidence ( which is 
banned ) and choosing not to disclose relevant evidence (which is generally permitted). This 
distinction overlaps extensively with that between actively misleading the court and passively 
standing by and letting the court fall into error by reason of its failure to ascertain facts which are in 
the lawyer’s knowledge.126 The latter is acceptable, the former is not. Unfortunately, this is an area of 
almost infinite shades of grey, as the following excursus on the relevant cases indicates.127   
 
Most expositions of the area start with Tombling v Universal Bulb Co Ltd128,  where a witness 
appeared in court wearing ordinary clothes, to give evidence at a trial. His lawyer in examining the 
witness on the stand, elicited the latter’s home address, the fact that he had previously been a prison 
governor, and the nature of his subsequent employment without revealing that the witness was 
currently imprisoned for a  motoring offence. The defence’s attempt to persuade the Court of Appeal 
that this behaviour justified a re-trial failed  because the majority of the Court took the view (1) that 
counsel had not set out with the deliberate intention to mislead the court by failing to indicate that 
witness was currently in prison and (2) because the witness’s motoring offence was not  relevant to 
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his credibility with respect to a completely unrelated matter. In commenting on whether or not the 
counsel should have informed the court that his client was appearing from prison, Denning L.J. said: 
 
“The duty of counsel to his client … is to make every honest endeavour to succeed.  He must 
not of course, knowingly mislead the court, either on the facts or on the law, but, short of that 
he may put such matters in evidence or omit such others as in his discretion he thinks will be 
most to the advantage of his client…The reason is because he is not the judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses or of the validity of the arguments. He is only the advocate 
employed by the client to speak for him and present his case, and he must do it to the best of 
his ability, without making himself the judge of its correctness, but only of its honesty.”129 
 
A similar issue arises where a lawyer is aware that his client has previous convictions but the judge 
and the prosecutor are not. The lawyer has no obligation to disclose the convictions  and indeed owes 
a duty of confidentiality to the client not to refer to them. He may therefore stand by silent while the 
court assumes that client is a first offender.130 However, the lawyer may not describe the client as a 
first offender, since that would be to actively mislead the court. What if the court asks the lawyer to 
confirm the client’s record? This puts the lawyer into a conflict between the duty of candour and the 
duty of confidentiality to the client. The lawyer may neither confirm the accuracy of the incorrect 
record nor breach the client’s confidence. An astute lawyer will consult with his or her client as soon 
as the error is detected and asked for permission to reveal the true position if the lawyer is questioned 
by the court on the matter, since this is likely to reflect credit on the accused. One Scottish writer has 
suggested that the lawyer may assert that there are no convictions libelled against the client.131 It must 
be doubtful if this would not be seen as actively misleading the court if it was volunteered as an 
unsolicited submission. But what if it was in response to an enquiry from the court? Given the 
position of conflict that the judge’s question has put the lawyer in, the response might be construed as 
passively misleading. However, many sheriffs would probably consider it to be actively misleading. 
The best course of action is to try to avoid the question if one can. 
 
A similar issue arose in an Australian case of Rumpf.132 The lawyer had invited the court to make a 
reparation order to compensate the victim, against his client, in the hope of attracting a lesser 
sentence. However, he did not mention that his client was bankrupt and that therefore the order would 
have been without practical effect. The Full Court of Victoria had little difficulty in holding that by 
volunteering the proposal of a reparation, but not mentioning the bankruptcy, the lawyer had actively 
misled the court  
 
The case of Meek v Fleming,133 is often contrasted with the Tombling case. Here an action was 
brought by a press photographer against a Chief Inspector, claiming damages for alleged assault and 
wrongful imprisonment by him.  By the time of the trial the Chief Inspector had been demoted to the 
rank of station sergeant for being party to a deception on a court of law.  His counsel after long and 
careful reflection decided that he could ethically suppress the evidence of his client’s demotion and its 
cause. Accordingly neither fact was put to the court and indeed steps were taken to keep it from the 
court in that the defendant appeared in court out of uniform and was repeatedly referred to as “Mr” 
rather than by rank. The judge and the counsel for the other side frequently referred to the defendant 
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as “Chief Inspector” - with the latter even at the start of the cross-examination confirming with the 
defendant that he was a Chief Inspector - without correction by the counsel for the defendant.   It was 
held that a new trial should take place as this matter went directly to the credibility of the witness, 
whose evidence was in conflict with that of the plaintiff. The court took the view that there had been a 
deliberate deceit by counsel on a matter material to the case with the intent of giving the impression 
that the defendant was still a Chief Inspector. In their view counsel had wrongfully subordinated his 
duty to the court to his duty to his client. 
 
The distinction between the Meek and the Tombling cases is that in the former, positive action was 
taken to deliberately deceive the court, in order to enhance the case of the defendant and concerned 
matters directly relevant to the case.  In the latter case, however, the deception was inadvertent and the 
information was not thought relevant to the case and was therefore simply omitted. Put another way, 
in Meek the lawyer actively sought to deceive the court on a matter that no reasonable lawyer could 
consider as immaterial to the case, whereas in Tombling, counsel merely omitted to lay certain facts 
before the court which he considered as non material to the case. 
 
The two contrasting cases offer guidance for other situations. Take the case where a witness or a party 
is attending in court from prison. Does the lawyer have to reveal this?   Sometimes it will be obvious ( 
because of the handcuffs and the attendant policemen ) that this is the situation, in which case there is 
no duty to say anything. It may, nonetheless be good tactics to do so e.g. where the client appears in 
court in relation to another offence from the one for which he was imprisoned. By failing to disclose 
this fact the lawyer may encourage the judge to feel that he or she is being misled and increase the 
chances that the client will receive a consecutive sentence. Such a course of action should be cleared 
with the client because of the duty to safeguard privileged and confidential information.134 However, 
where it is not obvious that the witness or accused appears from prison, then the lawyer should 
consider  whether the nature of the offence to which the sentence relates is pertinent to the case in 
hand.  
 
A case raising much the same issues involved a client in Scotland who appeared from custody at a 
bail hearing. His lawyer was aware, although the sheriff was not, that his client was doubly in 
custody, since he had been unsuccessful the previous week in obtaining bail in connection with an 
offence charged in another court. The accused gave his address as care of that of the lawyer’s office, 
when in fact he was in prison. When the sheriff discovered this, he took the view that he had been 
deliberately deceived. The lawyer’s defence was that he genuinely believed that he would be 
successful with a bail appeal for the earlier offence and that to disclose the prior offence would be to 
prejudice his client’s chances of getting bail for the second offence, even although the offences were 
completely unrelated. The Law Society of Scotland, applying the Meek and Tombling cases, 
concluded that the lawyer had only passively misled the court, since the use of his office address had 
not been deliberately designed to unfairly advantage the client.    
  
The distinction between actively and passively misleading the court also prompts us to consider what 
the position would be if the evidence as originally tendered to support the lawyer’s case is truthful, 
but subsequently, because of a change in circumstances, it ceases to be an accurate statement of the 
position. Is the lawyer guilty of misleading the court if he or she fails to inform the court of the 
changed circumstances? This issue arose in Vernon v. Bosley (No.2).135  In a somewhat unsatisfactory 
case, the three judges in the Court of Appeal upheld Meek and Tombling but disagreed amongst 
themselves on the fundamentals.  The facts concerned a plaintiff who had suffered from nervous 
shock following the death of two of his children, before his eyes, and succeeded in his claim for 
damages both in the lower court and the Court of Appeal, having relied heavily on the testimony of 
his medical experts to demonstrate the extent of his trauma and his poor prospects of a full recovery.  
After seventy days of evidence the proceedings in the personal injury case had been adjourned.  Prior 
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to final submissions being made to the court in the personal injury case an action was heard in the 
Family Division of the High Court, in which the same medical experts reached a more positive 
conclusion as to his prognosis than they had in the personal injuries case, thus enabling the plaintiff to 
argue that he was well enough to have a residence order in relation to his remaining children.  Counsel 
for the plaintiff became aware of the new medical opinion after final submissions had been made in 
the tort action, but before the judgement was handed down. He concluded that he had no ethical 
obligation to reveal to the personal injury judge that his client’s medical experts had now formed a 
different conclusion as to his prognosis, than they had when giving evidence before the judge.  
Counsel considered that he was not actively misleading the Court, since the evidence when originally 
tendered had been truthful, it was just that circumstances had changed.   Lord Justice Evans agreed 
with him but was in the minority.  Stuart-Smith L.J., however, said that counsel had actively misled 
the court in a manner akin to what had occurred in Meek since in his view counsel’s silence on the 
changed condition of the plaintiff misled the court as to a material fact in the case. Curiously, he was 
prepared to accept that the plaintiff’s counsel did not deliberately intend to deceive the court. Stuart-
Smith L.J. considered that the counsel should therefore have withdrawn136 from acting unless his 
client was willing to reveal the new evidence to the court, although there was no need for counsel to 
correct the “error”.  Thorpe L.J. agreed that the case was like Meek but considered that counsel should 
have informed the other side or the court if the client refused to agree to the evidence of his changed 
condition being revealed. 
    
The guidance to be derived from this case in Scotland is unclear. A close reading of the judgements in 
the Court of Appeal suggests that the outcome was partially influenced by the English law on 
discovery and by English decision of Re L137on litigation privilege in Family actions. Secondly, Evans 
L.J. in dissent was at pains to argue that this was not a case of evidence being fabricated, or false 
evidence having been given originally and not corrected, or of a witness changing his or her story. 
Here circumstances had changed. In the eyes of the plaintiff’s counsel he was not actively misleading 
or deceiving the court – he was simply not disclosing evidence that he was not required to proffer to 
the court. It is difficult not to conclude that, absent a requirement under the Scottish law of procedure 
to update the court on any change in the pursuer’s condition after the leading of the evidence and 
before final arguments, to follow this case in Scotland would mark a change in the balance of duties 
which comprise the adversarial system. Indeed Thorpe L.J. indicated as much when he rejected the 
dispassionate role “morality argument” of counsel for the plaintiff, advising him to pay more attention 
to his ordinary moral feelings, and added:  
 
“In general terms the balance between the advocate’s duty to the client and the advocate’s 
duty to the court must reflect evolutionary change within the civil justice system. If 
evolutionary shifts are necessary to match civil justice reforms they should in my judgement 
be towards strengthening the duty to the court. Differing practices and procedures in the 
family justice system, the criminal justice system, and the civil justice system must be 
reflected in different requirements in, for instance, a criminal trial and a Children Act 
hearing.” 
 
Ipp argues that Vernon is an instance of a “growing trend of courts to require cases to be determined 
in accordance with the objective ‘truth’ rather than on evidence adduced solely for reasons of 
perceived tactical advantage.” 138 While this may indeed be the case, it is also arguable that what we 
are witnessing is a recognition that “zealous advocacy in the adversarial system” is more justifiable in 
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criminal law cases or civil cases against the State than in family law or even other civil cases.139 Thus 
in ex parte applications, which by definition are not adversarial, the lawyer’s duty is to make full 
disclosure of all material facts known to him or her. This might also suggest that it is relevant that 
Vernon was not a criminal case and had Family elements. Certainly, Ipp argues that courts in family 
disputes and disputes involving children impose a duty of frankness and disclosure, stemming from 
the public interest that overrides the usual rules of the adversarial system. 
 
The acid test for this contextual ethics line of argument would be if there was to be a repetition of the 
facts of the Spaulding v. Zimmerman,140 but this time in Scotland. Here, a minor in the 1950s in 
Minnesota was injured in a road accident. None of the three doctors to examine the teenager for the 
purposes of supporting his action detected that the accident had begun to produce a life threatening 
aneurysm in his chest. The neurologist for the defendants, however, noticed it and brought it to 
attention of the defence lawyer. The plaintiff’s lawyer failed to seek discovery of the defendant’s 
medical report as he could have done and the defendant’s lawyer settled the case for considerably less 
than if the aneurysm had been detected. The parties then jointly sought the court’s approval of the 
settlement, since the plaintiff was a minor, which was duly granted. Two years later, the minor had a 
medical check up for other reasons and the aneurysm was detected. A successful operation then 
followed.  Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff sought to reduce the court’s agreement to the settlement. The 
Supreme Court upheld this application on the basis of the plaintiff’s minority and the emergence of 
“new” evidence, whilst affirming that there was no ethical or legal obligation on the defendant’s 
lawyer to reveal their medical evidence, in the absence of a request for discovery from the plaintiff. In 
Scotland discovery would not be open to the pursuer, and had the injury occurred to an adult, no 
challenge could have been taken to the settlement or the conduct of the defending lawyer. Moreover, 
under our adversarial system there would be no obligation in terms of professional ethics on the 
defendants to disclose their medical evidence to the court or the other side. Nonetheless, if Ipp is 
correct our courts might equally be tempted to reduce the settlement, on the grounds of his argument 
that courts in family disputes and disputes involving children impose a duty of frankness and 
disclosure, stemming from the public interest, that overrides the usual rules of the adversarial system. 
Even if they did not, the case raises sharply the question of whether the lawyer for the defence should 
not have allowed his or her conscience as a moral person to override the duty of client confidentiality 
and disclosed the existence of the aneurysm at the very latest after the settlement had gone through. 
   
1.6.5  Misleading evidence as perjury. A particular variant on the misleading evidence question 
which has attracted widespread, and hotly contested, comment in English speaking countries outside 
the UK, is the issue of client perjury. As Monroe Friedman observed in 1975141 the problem when 
perjury arises is that the “lawyer is required to know everything, to keep it in confidence, and to 
reveal it to the court.” This stems from the triple duty of the litigator to diligently elucidate all the 
relevant facts, to keep such facts confidential and thirdly not to mislead the court. These conflicting 
duties are exacerbated in the area of criminal defence by the onus on the Crown to prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt, the right to a minimally adequate defence,142 the right to a fair trial,143 and 
the right against self-incrimination. As M. Proulx and D. Layton, have observed144: 
 
“The question becomes, how can the profession’s ethical standards best accommodate the 
competing principles of loyalty to the client and solicitude towards the truth-finding function 
of the criminal justice system?”  
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Since, as we have seen, even the post-modern critics accept the case for neutral partisanship in 
relation to criminal defence work, it is not difficult to see that when the duty to the client is at its 
strongest it will sit uneasily with the litigator’s duties to the court. It is perhaps for this reason, that the 
ethical guidance in this area in English speaking jurisdictions is so often unclear or unsatisfactory.145 
Such is the complexity of the field that the lawyer’s best course of action can be affected by whether 
the case is civil or criminal, whether the perjury or proposed perjury arises before, during or after the 
trial, and whether it involves a client or another witness. 
 
In a difficult area, where there is almost no authority in Scotland and little more in the rest of the UK, 
there are only a few islands of safety where almost all English language commentators are agreed as 
to the best options, e.g. the importance of knowledge, the need to seek to dissuade the witness, and the 
need to take remedial action if persuasion fails. 
  
1.6.5.1  Perjury: the importance of knowledge. As in other areas where the duties to the client and 
to the court collide to form the parameters of the adversarial system of truth finding, much depends on 
the state of knowledge of the lawyer. Mere suspicion, or even a reasonable belief is not enough. The 
lawyer must have actual knowledge146 that the version of events that the client proposes to testify to is 
false or sufficient evidence from the circumstances to reach “an irresistible conclusion of falsity from 
available information”.147  This may come from a confession from the client or from the latter 
changing his or her story. However, neither of these in themselves is sufficient to establish knowledge 
without further probing of the client’s story to try to establish its truth or otherwise. The consensus of 
the commentators extends further. Although it is sometimes suggested the defence lawyers 
occasionally avoid eliciting from their clients what happened in the case, commentators generally 
agree that lawyers are not permitted to avoid acquiring knowledge of the client’s proposed perjury by 
wilful blindness or failing to investigate the facts of the case properly. To do so would be to sacrifice 
the duties of competence and diligence to the client.148 Equally, it is considered improper to interview 
an accused client in such a way as to assist the client to construct a version on events that will actually 
be perjured testimony.149 
  
1.6.5.2 Perjury: Persuading the witness to tell the truth. If the lawyer has reached the conclusion 
that the client has decided to commit perjury or has already committed perjury, almost all of the 
authorities and commentators suggest that the lawyer must seek to persuade the client or witness not 
to commit perjury or to correct any perjured testimony that has been offered. Typically, the 
client/witness should be told that perjury is a crime, that if discovered by the trier of fact it will 
probably assist in the accused’s conviction and if so, to a higher sentence. Next, the lawyer must 
explain to the client what the options facing him/her are.150 Most commentators also agree that finally 
the client should be told that the lawyer may be required to take remedial action. However, there the 
consensus ends, for although it is probably improper for the lawyer to coerce the accused by 
threatening a remedial action that he/she has no intention of carrying out; there is little agreement as 
to what that remedial action might be. Many authorities permit or require withdrawal, but this can be 
problematic if the trial is part heard.151 Further the authorities and commentators are sharply divided 
as to whether disclosure of the perjury to the court is ever permissible.152 
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1.6.5.3  Perjury: Opting to continue acting. If the client agrees not to commit perjury then the 
lawyer should continue to act. However, what if the client gives no such undertaking or refuses to 
correct the perjured testimony? Some authorities consider that the lawyer can continue to act if : 
(a) the lawyer does not know but only has a reasonable belief that the client will commit or has 
committed perjury;153 or  
(b)  if the lawyer insists that the client does not take the witness stand154; or  
(c) the client’s testimony is restricted to the truthful elements155; or  
(d) the client either makes an unsworn statement or provides the untruthful parts of the testimony in a 
narrative format to which the lawyer makes no subsequent reference in the trial156; or  
(e)the perjury is already complete, the lawyer makes no subsequent reference to the false testimony.157  
There is one other school of thought of which Monroe Freedman is the most celebrated adherent,158 
namely, that the lawyer having tried and failed to persuade the client to tell the truth, should continue 
to act as normal and use any testimony, perjured or otherwise in the case. This resolves the conflicts 
between the duties to the client and to the court, decisively in the former’s favour. It perhaps because 
it condones active misleading of the court and thus fundamentally tips the balance in the adversarial 
system away from “truth”, that this viewpoint has little support in ethical codes or amongst 
commentators,159 and we would not support it. 
 
1.6.5.4  Perjury:  Opting to withdraw but not disclosing the perjury. This approach is perhaps the 
most widely supported option where the client refuses to agree not to testify falsely or to reveal the 
completed falsehood to the court. It is supported in England,160 Canada,161 Australia162 and New 
Zealand163 and is likely to be followed in Scotland given the persuasive decision of the Privy Council 
in Sankar v. State of Trinidad and Tobago. Unfortunately, if the withdrawal requires the permission of 
the court because the trial is ongoing it may be difficult to get that permission without in effect revealing 
that perjury has been or is likely to be committed, and thus breaching the duty of confidentiality and 
loyalty to the client. The use of the formula that the lawyer would be “forensically embarrassed” by 
continuing certainly reveals the score to the judge and the prosecution, though not necessarily to the jury ( 
if there is one ). It is much better for the lawyer to indicate that the relationship with the client has broken 
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down irreparably.164 Certainly, great care must be taken before withdrawing. Thus in Tuckiar v. The 
King165 counsel was faced with a client in mid trial who confessed to the crime. Counsel announced in 
open court that he was in the worst predicament of his life and prevented his client from taking the stand. 
The judge, perhaps irritated by counsel’s breach of client privilege and lack of zealousness, commented 
on the accused’s failure to give evidence. The High Court of Australia was not impressed by counsel’s 
way of handling the dilemma he faced, however, they set aside the conviction nonetheless. In another 
murder trial, Sankar v. State of Trinidad and Tobago166 the accused once again informed his counsel in 
mid-trial of his guilt. Once again counsel told the client to remain silent and thereafter in closing 
argument made it clear that he was simply putting the prosecution to the test. The Privy Council indicated 
that in such a situation it was the duty of defence counsel to investigate the matter fully and advise the 
accused as to his options, if necessary seeking an adjournment for the purpose. It was not appropriate for 
counsel forthwith to abandon the positive defence originally proposed (e.g. self-defence, provocation or 
accident) and to refuse to put the accused in the witness box or to allow him to make an unsworn 
statement from the dock. Instead counsel should have explained the importance of the accused’s evidence 
for the positive defence, and that without it there was in practice no defence. If the accused had persisted 
in his desire to behave in a manner which was inconsistent with counsel’s duty to the court, then counsel 
could have withdrawn after explaining the options available to the accused.  
 
In Scotland the course of action proposed in Sankar poses particular difficulty where the client waits 
until they are in the witness box before launching into an account of events that is completely 
inconsistent with the story that he/she has consistently told their lawyer in earlier stages. In the case of 
solicitor-advocates, under the Solicitors (Scotland) Rules of Conduct for Solicitor Advocates 2002,  
r.7(4) a solicitor advocate may not be a party to the giving of evidence which he knows to be perjured 
evidence, or to any other course that would enable a case to be put forward on behalf of a client which 
the client has informed him is unfounded in fact. Does standing by while your client appears to be 
perjuring himself/ herself, breach r.7(4)? It is tempting to follow the suggestion in Sankar and seek an 
adjournment in which to have a free and frank discussion with your client. However, under  r.7(10) of the 
Code of Conduct a solicitor-advocate may not, except with consent of his opponent and of the court, 
communicate with any witness, including his client, once that witness has begun to give evidence 
until that evidence is concluded. Reconciling this with  r.7(4) is not easy. Assuming that you find your 
client’s change of heart unpersuasive and that your client does not wish to change his plea, you can 
either advise your client that you intend to withdraw, or advise your client that your representation 
will be limited to questioning whether the prosecution has proved their case. Finally, to complicate 
matters the Law Society considers that Rule 7(10) does not apply to ordinary solicitors. 
Unfortunately, not all the judiciary agrees with them on this point. 
 
1.6.5.5  Perjury: Opting to withdraw but also disclosing the perjury. Although withdrawal 
without disclosure of the perjury to the court has a wide measure of support, some critics are 
unconvinced since it merely warns the accused to be less honest with his or her next lawyer. Perhaps 
for this reason, there has also been a school of thought which favours the opposite of the Freedman 
argument by ultimately placing the duty of candour before the duty of loyalty and confidentiality. Few 
commentators have endorsed the lawyer withdrawing and disclosing the proposed perjury before it 
has been committed.167 However, the threat to do so if the accused persisted with his intention to 
commit perjury was upheld by the majority of the Supreme Court in the controversial decision in Nix 
v Whiteside.168 Certainly, the writers have been more willing to advocate the disclosure of a completed 
client perjury,169 although relatively few Codes of Conduct clearly support this. One that does, in a 
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considerably stronger form than its earlier version, is the 2002 ABA Model Rules 3.3(a)(3). After more 
than forty years of debate amongst American jurists the new Model Rules have come down decisively in 
favour of disclosure if a perjury has been committed, the client will not correct it and other measures e.g. 
withdrawal will not cure the perjury.170 This is a significant shift towards concluding that in the area of 
perjury, even in criminal cases, ultimately the ABA favoured the duty not to deceive the court or to 
subvert the truth-finding process171 over the duties of loyalty and confidentiality to the client. 
   
1.7 A general duty not to interfere with the administration of justice. Ipp’s final set of duties to 
the court relate to the dangers of excessive zeal by a lawyer for his or her client and the need not to 
overstep the mark.172 The spectrum of temptation for lawyers ranges from clear cut, criminal 
interferences with the course of justice such as perjury, tampering with witnesses and forgery  to 
situations where an excess of zeal will constitute a conduct offence at  worst such as the permitted 
limits to defending the guilty, discrediting truthful witnesses, demeaning or denigrating witnesses, 
taking advantage of obvious mistakes, the lawyer taking the witness stand and finally, acting in a 
conflict of interest. 
 
1.7.1 Perjury. Perjury is a criminal offence and for a lawyer to encourage a client or witness to 
commit perjury would not only be criminal act in itself173 but also a breach of the lawyer’s duty to the 
court, which would not be covered by legal professional privilege. However, there can sometimes be a 
fine line between refreshing a witness’s memory and assisting with perjury.174 
 
1.7.2 Tampering with witnesses. It is a breach of the lawyer’s duty to the court to put witnesses 
under pressure to adjust their evidence in particular directions, just as it is impermissible to encourage 
them to give evidence which the witness does not believe to be true,175 or to suggest to them that they 
be forgetful or evasive.176 While, at least in the USA and England it is permissible to take witnesses 
through their evidence to refresh their memory the lawyer has to take care that this does not become a 
process in which witnesses are coached as to the answers to give to possible questions. Equally, while 
it is acceptable to tell a witness that that you do not propose to call on them to testify, to encourage 
them to go on a long holiday or in other ways to make it difficult for the opposing side to trace them is 
to interfere with the course of justice as well as a breach of duty to the court.177 
 
1.7.3 Forgery or falsified documentation.178 It goes without saying that lawyers who present false or 
altered documentation to the court are at risk of criminal conviction or a finding of misconduct. Thus 
a solicitor who repeatedly signed executions of service on summonses although he knew or should 
have known that he had not signed the citations on the relevant service copy summonses was found 
guilty of misconduct.179 Again an English solicitor who deliberately  forged his colleague’s signature 
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on a witness statement for her own Industrial Tribunal case received a six month jail sentence for 
forgery.180 Even if no one is harmed by the process it may be misconduct. Thus a Scottish solicitor 
who altered and lodged in court a Joint Minute without the knowledge or consent of the party on 
whose behalf the Joint Minute had already been signed, was found guilty of misconduct by the 
Tribunal. Although the alteration had not affected the other party’s interest , the Tribunal held that the 
unauthorised alteration was in breach of the implied understanding from the other party that the 
document would not be altered and thus constituted a breach of trust.181 Similarly, in a case in 2003182 
the solicitor in question was found guilty of professional misconduct for notarising documents outwith 
the presence of the deponing witness, signing dockets which he which he knew to be false in respect 
of the date and whether the witness was present or not and his tendering of these documents as 
evidence in the sheriff court.  
    
1.7.4 The limits to Defending the Guilty. Occasionally, through an accused’s confession or 
otherwise the lawyer for the accused comes to appreciate that the client is guilty of the offence with 
which he or she has been charged. This does not require the lawyer to withdraw from acting or to 
insist that the client enters or changes his/ her plea to guilty. However, the lawyer’s knowledge 
coupled with the duty not to mislead the court restricts the scope of the defence that he or she may run 
since in the new situation the balance to be drawn between the lawyer’s duties to his or her client183 
and the duties to the court and the justice system on the other, is subtlety altered. (As such, as was 
noted in para 1.1, it reflects that in this situation a slightly different conception of the role of the 
advocate in the adversarial system and the scope for manoeuvre by the lawyer prevails.) 
 
As in the case of perjury, mere reasonable suspicion or belief that the client is actually guilty will not 
suffice to restrict the lawyer’s scope for action. Nor is the fact of a confession from the accused sufficient 
since he or she may be confused, deluded, exhausted or even trying to shield another person. Where, 
however, the lawyer reasonably comes to an “irresistible knowledge” 184of a client’s guilt based on a 
thorough investigation of the case then the restriction on the scope of the defence will apply. Again, as 
with perjury, commentators are largely agreed that for lawyers to avoid acquiring knowledge of the 
client’s guilt by wilful blindness or failing to investigate the facts of the case properly, is to sacrifice 
the duties of competence and diligence to the client.185  This is not, however, to suggest that it is part 
of the lawyer’s role set out to form an opinion as to whether his or her client is actually guilty – that 
would be to usurp the role of the judge and jury. Thus the celebrated Scots defence lawyer, Joseph 
Beltrami, observed on the matter:186 
 
“When solicitors see a client for the first time they do not ? at least, I do not ? ask him whether 
or not he is guilty of the charge.  The matter is put this way: How will you be pleading to the 
charge - Guilty or Not Guilty?  If a client says ‘Guilty’, then steps are taken to act on this 
instruction.  If he replies ‘Not Guilty’, then the preparation for the defence begins. If, in the course 
of further dealings with the client, he advises me that he is guilty of the charge, then I can take one 
of two courses.  I can send him to a solicitor outside my firm.  Or I can continue to defend him ? 
on the clear understanding that, whereas I can put the Crown to the test with regard to proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, I cannot lead a substantive defence on his part.” 
 
Nonetheless, there will be occasions where the client’s admission or diligent investigation of the case 
leaves the lawyer with “irresistible knowledge” of the client’s guilt. In these situations the lawyer may 
not conduct the defence on a basis that is inconsistent with the knowledge, for example,  by 
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suggesting to a witness that his or her client is innocent or was elsewhere or that another person 
committed the crime.187 Although the lawyer is prevented from running an affirmative defence he or 
she can and indeed must put the strength of the prosecution’s case to the test.  This might include:188 
1) challenging the jurisdiction of the court; 
2) challenging the competency or relevancy of the indictment or complaint; 
3) challenging the admissibility of evidence; 
4) testing the prosecution’s evidence in cross-examination – thus even a “truthful” witness can 
be questioned as to their eyesight or the lighting conditions at the time; 
5) leading evidence to support a defence of insanity or self-defence; 
6) leading evidence required for a successful plea in mitigation; 
7) making submissions as to the sufficiency in law of the evidence to support a verdict of guilty.  
 
1.7.5 The limits to discrediting truthful witnesses. From time to time, particularly where the client 
has confessed his or her guilt to the lawyer, the latter will be faced with a witness whose testimony the 
client affirms to be truthful or the lawyer’s investigations suggest is truthful, e.g. correctly testifying 
that the accused was near the scene of the crime at the relevant time and date. Notwithstanding this, 
the lawyer may cross-examine the witness to test the witnesses’ eyesight, accuracy in estimating 
distances or height, ability to recall details or to ascertain the lighting conditions. This may not be 
done in such a way as to suggest an  affirmative defence or that the accused was elsewhere or 
innocent.  Indeed, the more vigorous and intensive the cross-examination the more it will appear like 
an affirmative defence. There are also other difficult areas. Is it legitimate to try to establish in cross-
examination that the truthful witness has an animus against the accused, when to do so is not to test 
the accuracy of the witness’s recall or eyesight but rather to suggest that the witness is lying and that 
the accused is innocent? Similarly, is it permissible to attack the character of the truthful witness? The 
better answer seems to be in the negative, particularly if it arises in a civil case,189 but also in criminal 
defence cases, since both lines of attack are designed to suggest that the witness is lying rather than 
simply mistaken. It seems then, that when dealing with a truthful witness, it is permissible to seek to 
establish whether the truthful testimony is more than mere happenstance, but not to go further and to 
suggest that the witness is lying.190  
 
1.7.6 The limits to demeaning or denigrating witnesses and others in court. Neither an advocate 
nor a solicitor advocate may suggest to a witness who is testifying that they have been guilty of a 
crime, fraud or other illegal or improper conduct unless the lawyer has reasonably concluded that 
there is evidence which could, if necessary, be led in support of the suggestion.191 It is assumed that 
this holds true for solicitors also. Harassment of witnesses can distort the truth-finding process as well 
as amounting to abuse of power. Lawyers who take advantage of their position in examining or cross-
examining witnesses to demean, bully, or insult them, risk bringing our system of justice into 
disrepute as well undermining its long term efficacy.192 In the USA the federal judiciary has a positive 
obligation to protect witnesses against harassment. The same obligation should exist in Scotland. This 
is particularly true in the case of vulnerable witnesses and both in Scotland193 and England194 there 
have been efforts to afford greater protection to such witnesses in recent years. There is little public 
understanding for the perceived vilification which some victims of rape have been subjected to in the 
courts in the last twenty years. Apologists for zealous advocacy rightly point to the need for unpopular 
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clients to be provided with effective defence advocacy if the ideals of the adversarial system and the 
right to a fair trial are to be upheld. However, victim support groups are also correct to claim that 
vulnerable victims and witnesses also have human rights. It may take a ruling from the European 
Court of Human Rights to determine how the conflict between these mutually inconsistent human 
rights should be resolved.195 Quite apart from the law and professional ethics it is perhaps also worth 
bearing in mind that it is usually unwise tactics to browbeat or demean an elderly, truthful witness or 
an vulnerable victim  since the sympathy of the jury is likely to be with them. 
 
1.7.7 Respecting the court. The duty to avoid excessive zeal for a client and the need not to overstep 
the mark, requires lawyers as officers of the court to honour any undertakings which they have given 
to the court.196 Failure to do so is likely to be a conduct offence. Similarly, a lawyer who defies a clear 
ruling of the court may either be guilty of contempt of court or of a conduct offence. In Blair-Wilson, 
Petnr197 a solicitor sought to play a tape-recording to a witness as part of his cross-examination. The 
sheriff, for reasons which remain unclear, refused to allow this – or at least at that stage of the 
proceedings. The solicitor’s efforts to seek clarification of the sheriff’s position lead the latter to 
regard the solicitor as being in defiance of a court order and therefore guilty of contempt of court. The 
High Court held that it was established law that if a judge makes a ruling in clear terms which the 
lawyer then refuses to comply with or obey, this can amount to contempt provided “an intention to 
challenge or affront the of the court or to defy its order” can be proved.198 In this case the High Court 
concluded that the sheriff had not made a clear ruling and that the solicitor had not defied such a 
ruling and was  therefore not guilty of contempt. 
  
1.7.8 The limits to taking advantage of obvious mistakes. Ipp199 is of the opinion that 
even in the adversarial system, lawyers, as officers of the court should not take unfair advantage of 
obvious mistakes by the other side.200 As far as mistakes in law are concerned, many English speaking 
jurisdictions take the view that the lawyer should not take advantage of errors of law ( including those  
by the judge ) any more than misleading the court on a point of law.201  It would seem reasonable to 
conclude that since acting in this way breaches no duty to the client and conforms with the lawyer’s 
duties to the court to assist with the proper administration of justice, that this should be followed in 
Scotland also. 202 
 
However, what about errors of fact? As we saw in relation to misleading the court on matters of fact, a 
distinction is normally drawn between commission – actively misleading and omission – passively 
misleading the court. Some have criticised this distinction, arguing that to win by failing to correct a 
judicial error or an obvious procedural error by the other side, even in a criminal case, is to jeopardise 
the duty of the lawyer to assist in the proper administration of justice.203 However, there is good 
reason to believe that in Scotland this position does not prevail.  When in the past the Crown 
miscalculated the days before initiating the trial due it being a leap year, and thus miscalculated when 
the 110th day had arrived, there was no suggestion from any in the profession that the lawyers for the 
accused had behaved in anything other than impeccable propriety in not revealing this error until after 
the 111th day was well under way. Joseph Beltrami describes one such case in which he was involved 
in The Defender204 : 
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“There were various editorials in the national Press about this dramatic turn of events, and some 
writers stated that it was the duty of the defence to advise the prosecution of such a matter, since it 
was merely a technicality.  They went on to argue that the defence should not take advantage of 
such a situation.  My answer to this proposition is that the two accused were acquitted because of 
the law prevailing in our country at the time.  To have advised the prosecution on the Tuesday and 
so caused them to make application to the Court for an extension would have been betraying the 
interests of both clients.” 
  
1.7.9 The perils of the lawyer taking the witness stand. It is widely accepted that it is,  
undesirable for a solicitor or an advocate to appear as a witness in a case in which he or she is acting.  
Thus Webster205 opines that a lawyer should not act in any proceedings in which he or she is likely to 
be called as a witness, except to give formal evidence, for example,  as to the execution of a deed. 
Thornton,206 likewise, indicates that counsel should reject a brief where it can be anticipated that he or 
she is likely to become a witness. Where a barrister cannot  avoid giving evidence, then, he suggests, 
they are required to withdraw from acting. As so often, this is an area which has attracted considerable 
commentary in the USA207 culminating in  r.3.7 of the Model Rules 2002. The latter provides that: 
 
“A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness unless: 
1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or 
3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.” 
 
The rationale for the limits imposed on lawyers acting as witnesses is twofold. First, because there is a 
potential for misleading the court and secondly because there is a potential for conflict between the 
lawyer and the client – especially if there is likely to be a conflict between the testimony of the lawyer 
and that of the client, remembering that the lawyer may be called to testify either by the client or by 
the other side. The first argument is that the fact-finder, particularly if it is a jury, may be confused as 
to which capacity the lawyer is appearing in, when speaking from the witness box. This is a systemic 




1.7.10 Avoiding Conflicts of Interest. As the last paragraph indicated the duty to avoid acting in a 
conflict of interest is another aspect of the lawyer’s duty to the court to safeguard the administration 
of justice. As Ipp argues, the duty to the court “arises from the court’s concern that it should have the 
assistance of independent legal representation for the litigants”.209 While the court will disqualify 
lawyers where there is a threatened breach of fiduciary duty, it can also do so where continued 
representation would lead to a breach of duty to the court because the lawyer was no longer able to act 
with the objectivity and independence required by the court.210 The Guide to the Professional Conduct 
of Advocates and the dictum of Lord President Inglis in Batchelor v. Pattison and Mackersy211 place a 
similar emphasis on the importance of the advocate being “entirely independent” in representing a 
client. Inglis, however, was less clear that a solicitor had the same degree of independence from the 
client given the contract of employment that exists between the solicitor and the client. It should be 
said, however, that judges will be understandably reluctant to disqualify a lawyer on this ground if it 
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comes late in the day or it appears like a device for tactical advantage, and when disqualification will 
be likely to result in undue costs to an innocent party.  
 
